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TORTS-PARENT AND CHILD-DOCTRINE OF PARENTAL IMMUNITY-Plaintiff, 
a minor, sustained injuries in a collision which occurred while he was riding 
in a car owned and driven by defendant, his father. The complaint alleged 
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that defendant was guilty of willful and wanton misconduct, consisting of 
speeding on a wet road on a foggy night and of running a stop light. A • 
motion to dismiss on the ground that the suit was contrary to public policy· 
was. sustained. On appeal, held, reversed. The doctrine of parental im-
munity is inapplicable to cases of willful and wanton misconduct. Nudd V-
Matsoukas, (III. 1956) 131 N.E. (2d) 525. 
With the loss in popular favor of the theory of parental autocracy,. 
there has been a slow but noticeable erosion of the doctrine first laid down 
in Hewlett v. George1 that an unemancipated child's only protection from 
personal injuries inflicted by a parent rested in the deterrent effect of 
criminal sanctions imposed by the criminal law.2 The rule barring suit in 
such cases stems from the solicitude of the courts for the preservation of 
domestic tranquility, although it would seem that this position overlooks. 
the probability that uncompensated torts would, if anything, promote family 
discord. This objection loses all force, however, in the numerous instances. 
where an insurance company is really the defendant party in interest.3 
Probably in revulsion to such cases as Roller v. Roller, 4 where a daughter 
was denied civil recovery against her father who had been convicted of 
raping her, a line of authority has grown up that immunity to civil suit is. 
lost in instances where a parent is guilty of intentional tortious conduct.11. 
Concurrently, impressive authority has developed denying recovery to chil-
dren injured in ordinary negligence actions arising from automobile ac-
cidents in which their parents are at fault, on the basis of the traditional 
immunity rule.6 Courts deciding these cases have ignored the reason for 
retention of the negligence aspect of the rule, viz., to discourage judicial 
interference with parents' legitimate disciplinary rights.7 In the sense that 
the term "negligence" is used in automobile accident cases, it is wholly 
extraneous to the problem of preserving the necessary freedom for parental 
discipline. It would appear, rather, that these cases should be treated like 
those in which there is a recognized additional relationship between the 
parent and child such as master-servant or carrier-passenger. In situations 
of the latter type authority exists which permits a child to recover for in-
juries negligently inflicted by his parent. 8 Of course, such an approach 
1 68 Miss. 703, 9 S. 885 (1891). 
2 The court, perhaps by erroneous analogy to the husband and wife situation, thought 
it was applying a common law doctrine. It cited no cases in support of its position and 
apparently there were none. 
3 Despite this, no jurisdiction has repudiated the rule in its entirety. Prosser's opinion 
that Missouri had done so was shown to be incorrect by the case of Baker v. Bak_er, 364 
Mo. 453, 263 S.W. (2d) 29 (1954). See PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 677 (1955). 
4 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905). This case was overruled by the Washington court 
in Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. (2d) 642, 251 P. (2d) 149 (1952). 
5 See Brown v. Cole, 198 Ark. 417, 129 S.W. (2d) 245 (1939); 19 A.L.R. (2d) 423 at 
451 (1951). 
6 Ownby v. Kleyhammer, 194 Tenn. 109, 250 S.W. (2d) 37 (1952). See 19 A.L.R. (2d) 
423 at 442 (1951). 
1 Borst v. Borst, note 4 supra, at 156. 
s Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930); Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W.Va. 17, 166 
S.E. 538 (1932). 
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would not seem to be possible where a state has an automobile guest 
statute, as did Illinois in the principal case,0 which requires an aggravated 
degree of negligence in order to create liability.10 Oddly enough, the 
court in the principal case did not mention that, by alleging willful and 
wanton misconduct, plaintiff brought himself squarely within the express 
language of the guest statute. The parental immunity doctrine apparently 
was considered the only possible obstacle to the suit. In conjunction with 
the holding that as to the behavior involved here the doctrine is no bar, 
there is the implication that a parent remains immune in Illinois against 
actions for ordinary negligence. However, other language in the opinion11 
indicates that the court is concerned with the matter of the scope of the 
parental relation, i.e., when a parent is acting as a parent and when he is 
not. From this a faint hope may be derived that the future operation of 
the rule will be restricted as suggested.12 Unfortunately, in stating the 
bounds of parental liability, the Illinois court makes use of an imprecise 
and troublesome standard. Experience under the guest acts indicates that 
"willful and wanton misconduct" and its several counterparts13 are not very 
meaningful pegs on which to fasten liability.14 Surely it is a monstrous 
proposition to hold a parent to a lesser degree of care toward his child 
than toward others. If the rule of the principal case were applied in cases 
arising in jurisdictions not having guest statutes, or in cases of parentally 
inflicted injuries not involving automobiles, the result would be to hold a 
parent generally to a substantially lesser degree of care toward his child 
than toward other persons. It would seem that it is only in the area of 
discipline stemming from the peculiar parent-child relation that there can 
appropriately be room for such limitation. 
Julian]. Linde, S.Ed. 
11 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 95½, §58a. 
10 Situations can be imagined, however, in which a child would be outside of the 
"guest" category. See 3 Wvo. L.J. 225 (1949). 
11 Principal case at 531. 
12 If the court in the principal case does not go far enough, in allowing any concept 
of constructive intent to broaden the parents' potential area of liability, it nevertheless 
goes farther than most jurisdictions have gone as yet. See Wright v. Wright, 85 Ga. App. 
721, 70 S.E. (2d) 152 (1952); Emery v. Emery, 284 P. (2d) 150 (1955), mod. 45 Cal. (2d) 
421, 289 P. (2d) 218 (1955). Contra, Owens v. Auto Mutual Indemnity Co., 235 Ala. 9, 
177 s. 133 (1937). 
13 See 35 MICH. L. REv. 804 (1937). 
14 See Appleman, "Wilful and Wanton Conduct in Automobile Guest Cases," 13 IND. 
L.J. 131 (1937). 
